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Abstract 
This paper proposes an application of standard evaluation techniques to obtain 
an early indication of the efficiency of a social program. An explicit distinction 
is made between participation and treatment since non-participants in many 
cases can find treatment outside of the program. By estimating the amount of 
treatment participants would have received if there had been no program it is 
possible to derive the net treatment provided by the program as soon as the first 
participants have entered the program. Using propensity score matching to 
study substitutes in the recently implemented Swedish “Career Break“ pilot 
program we obtain three main results: First, the selection into the program 
favours participants that would have received treatment even without the 
program. Second, the net treatment provided by the program is on average only 
about half of the expected program length. Third, a simulation shows how the 
net treatment could be increased by a simple change in the eligibility criteria. 
Keywords:  Evaluation, Propensity score matching, Social programmes, 
Treatment intensity 
JEL: C14, J38, J68  
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1 Introduction 
Policy makers are showing growing interest in evaluations of social pro-
grammes. One increasingly popular method of facilitating evaluations is to 
conduct experiments or pilot programmes. There is, however, a common 
conflict-of-interest between the researchers’ need for long follow-up periods 
and the policy-makers’ need for swift answers. This paper proposes and applies 
a simple method to provide information on the expected efficiency of a 
program shortly after the start of the program.  
Many social programmes provide a treatment that can be obtained without 
participation in the program. For example, participants in a subsidized employ-
ment program can find employment even outside the program. Thus, it is 
important to distinguish between participation and treatment when evaluating a 
program. The actual net intensity of treatment, defined as the extra treatment 
provided by the program depends on the counterfactual time-use of the pro-
gram participants during the program period. The more treatment the partici-
pants would have received had they not participated, the weaker the treatment 
intensity of the program.  
In this paper we suggest that estimation of the net intensity of treatment 
provides a good indicator of program performance when data on post-program 
outcomes are unavailable. The method should be applicable in all cases where 
social programmes provide a treatment that the participants can acquire 
elsewhere; e.g. programmes that involve subsidies of employment, day care, 
education, or health insurance. We further suggest that propensity score 
matching is a suitable tool for estimating the counterfactual time-use during 
participation whenever the data is rich enough to fulfil the conditional indepen-
dence assumption. Matching also allows for simulations of how changes in the 
eligibility criteria can increase the net intensity of treatment. We illustrate the 
method in an empirical application by estimating the net treatment intensity on 
the substitutes in the Swedish career-break pilot program and by providing 
some simulation results showing how changes in the eligibility criteria may 
increase the net treatment intensity of the program. 
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2  The evaluation problem 
2.1  The net intensity of treatment 
The evaluation literature typically uses a terminology of potential outcomes to 
describe the outcomes of an individual participating in a program (Y
1) and the 
outcome of the same individual if not participating (Y
0). Denoting participation 
by D = 1 and non-participation by D = 0 we can write the actual outcome for 
an arbitrary individual i as: 
 
(1)  ( )
0 1 1 i i i i i Y D Y D Y − + = . 
 
Assume that we ultimately are interested in how the program affects the 
participants. This parameter is defined as: 
 
(2)  [ ] 1
0 1 = − = ∆ D Y Y E i i  
 
While  ∆ is the ultimate parameter of interest, estimation of that parameter 
requires a long follow-up period. However, we note that in many cases treat-
ment is not limited to program participants only. The efficiency of the program 
is of course smaller if some of the participants would have gotten the treatment 
anyway (ceteris paribus).  
We thus propose that estimating the effect of program participation on the 
net treatment intensity will provide useful information about the program 
efficiency early on in the implementation process. The stronger the treatment 
intensity, the more can we expect of the effect of the program.
1 We assume that 
participation in a program (i.e. D = 1) affects the outcome (Y) only through the 
provision of a treatment denoted by T, and that the treatment is the same within 
and outside the program. This gives us a two-step model in which program 
participation affects the (continuous) treatment (assumed to be bounded by 0 
and 1) which, in turn, affects the outcome. We denote treatment for participants 
and non-participants by T
1 and T
0 and assume that program participants receive 
                                                      
1 Making the reasonable assumption that the program is instituted with a prior of positive 
treatment effects for the participants. In the model below we further assume that treatment affects 
the outcome linearly. This assumption is, however, simply for convenience. IFAU – Early indication of program performance  5 
full treatment while non-participants get some a priori unknown level of 
treatment: 
 
(3) 
[] 1 , 0
1
0
0
1
1
∈ ≡
= ≡
=
=
i
i
D i i
D i i
T T
T T
 
 
The outcome of participants and non-participants depend linearly on treatment 
as a weighted average of two underlying outcome variables Y
T and Y
NT. Thus, 
using equation  (3), we may write the outcome of participants and non-
participants as: 
 
(4)  ()
NT
i i
T
i i D i i
T
i D i i
Y T Y T Y Y
Y Y Y
i
i
0 0
0
0
1
1
1− + = ≡
= ≡
=
=
 
 
Using (1) and (4) we see that actual outcome is related to participation and 
treatment as: 
 
(5)  ( ) ( ) [ ]
NT
i i
T
i i i
T
i i i Y T Y T D Y D Y
0 0 1 1 − + − + =  
 
Rewriting our ultimate parameter of interest (equation 2) as a function of 
treatment we get: 
 
(6)      ( )( ) [ ] ( )( ) [ ] 1   1 1  
0 0 1 = − − = = − − = ∆ D Y Y T E D Y Y T T E
NT
i
T
i i
NT
i
T
i i i  
 
However, since we do not have data on outcomes, the parameter to be 
estimated in this paper is the net treatment intensity for the participants defined 
as: 
 
(7)  ( ) ( ) 1 1 1
0 0 1 = − = = − ≡ Λ D T E D T T E i i i  
 
In words, equation (6) states that the effect of participation for each participant 
is the net treatment intensity of the program times the effect on the outcome of IFAU – Early indication of program performance  6 
each unit of treatment. Equation (7) denotes the expected value of the net 
treatment intensity that is to be estimated.
2 Assuming that the effect of actual 
treatment is positive, the average program effect (i.e. ∆) is increasing in (1-T
0
i) 
and in the limiting (trivial) case, where the participants would have received 
full treatment even in absence of the program, the program effect will always 
be zero. Furthermore, in empirical applications the net treatment intensity (Λ) 
may be a function of some covariates. Estimation of Λ will thus allow for an 
analysis of how the net treatment intensity varies with the covariates, and thus 
how a change in the eligibility criteria would affect net treatment.  
 
2.2 Matching  estimator 
To obtain the net treatment intensity, we need an estimate of the counterfactual 
time-use of the participants,  ( ) 1
0 = D T E i . Thus the objective here, as in all 
non-experimental studies, is to construct a comparison group that is as close as 
possible to an experimental, randomly assigned, comparison group. A possible 
method used for solving this problem is matching.
3 In short, matching involves 
pairing participating individuals with a comparison group that is similar in 
terms of observable characteristics.  
The crucial assumption behind matching is that all differences between the 
participants and the comparison group affecting both the selection and the 
outcome are captured by characteristics (X) that are observed by the evaluator. 
This conditional independence assumption (CIA) is formalized as: 
 
(8)  { } , , ,
1 0 χ ∈ ∀ = x x X D Y Y C   
 
                                                      
2 The practical value of this estimate may vary between implementations since there is a potential 
covariance between the effect of the treatment and the net treatment intensity. Defining the 
maximum treatment effect (that would have been the effect if only the participants received 
treatment) as  ] 1 [ ~ = − ≡ ∆ D Y Y E
NT
i
T
i  we can rewrite the actual treatment effect as 
) ~ , cov( ~   ∆ Λ + ∆ Λ = ∆ . Thus, there may be applications with a large program effect despite low 
treatment intensity if the covariance is sufficiently negative, i.e. if workers receiving a small net 
treatment also have a large effect of treatment. Whether this is likely or not has to be evaluated 
from case to case. 
3 See Rubin 1977; Rosenbaum & Rubin 1983, 1984, 1985; Rubin & Thomas 1992. IFAU – Early indication of program performance  7 
where χ denotes the set of covariates for which the average treatment effect is 
defined. In words, the CIA requires that, given all the relevant characteristics 
(X), the individual participation decision is not based on the actual outcomes. 
When estimating the net treatment intensity instead of the long term effect 
of the program, the outcome is the treatment T. Thus, the CIA must yield 
independence between the participation D and the treatment T: 
 
(9)  { } . , ,
1 0 χ ∈ ∀ = x x X D T T C  
 
The assumption requires that, given all the observable characteristics, the 
participation decision is not based on how much treatment the individual will 
receive when participating or not in the program. Moreover, in order for the 
average participation effect to be identified, the probability of participation 
must be strictly between zero and one: 
 
(10)  () ( ) ( ) x X D P x P where x P = = = < < 1 , 1 0 
 
When these two assumptions are fulfilled the counterfactual outcome, 
( ) x X D T E i = = , 1
0 , can be obtained by simply matching the participants with 
identical (with respect to X) non-participants, and then taking the average of 
the non-participants’ outcomes:  ( ) x X D T E i = = , 0
0 .  
In their seminal paper on matching, Rosenbaum & Rubin (1983) show that 
if the CIA is valid for X, it is also valid for a function of X called the balancing 
score b(X), such that  ( ) C X b D X .The main advantage of the balancing score 
property is the decrease in dimensionality: instead of conditioning on all the 
observable covariates, it is sufficient to condition on some function of the 
covariates. In the case of one treatment, the balancing score with the lowest 
dimension is the propensity score  ( ) ( ) [ ] x X D P E x P = = = 1 . 
Thus, propensity score matching is a suitable tool for estimating the net 
treatment intensity whenever the data are rich enough to fulfil the CIA between 
the treatment and the participation. This in turn should be a reasonable 
assumption whenever we are willing to assume that the “traditional” CIA 
between the outcome and the participation. Of course, the validity of this 
assumption should be considered carefully in each empirical application.  
 IFAU – Early indication of program performance  8 
 
3 Empirical  application 
3.1  The substitutes in the Swedish Career Break program 
The Swedish career-break program was instituted as a pilot program in 12 
Swedish municipalities starting in February 2002. The program provides public 
financing for an employed individual during 3-12 months leave-of-absence.
4 
Employer consent is required, and the employer is free to choose any substitute 
as long as he or she is registered as unemployed at the unemployment office. 
That is, the substitutes do not have to be long-term unemployed. 
The pilot is scheduled to run until the end of 2004 whereupon the program 
is to be evaluated. However, during negotiations following the 2002 general 
elections it was decided that the career-break program should be introduced on 
a permanent and national basis starting in 2005. Since the final details on the 
design of the national program were left for discussions during 2003 and 2004, 
a need arose for some results regarding the consequences of the program before 
the end of the piloting scheme.  
One of the targets, and thereby one of the expected effects of the program is 
to improve the future labour market situation of the substitutes. The treatment 
to achieve this is the temporary employment created by the program. As an 
application of the net treatment intensity parameter, we will estimate the extent 
to which the substitutes would have been employed even in the absence of the 
program. Thus, we are able to calculate the fraction of average program length 
that the participants actually received treatment due to the program.  
 
3.2 Data   
The analysis uses the register data base from the National Labour Market 
Board (Händel) that contains information on all registered unemployed 
individuals as well as employed job-seekers who wish to use the services of the 
unemployment offices.
5 In addition to the detailed description of each 
                                                      
4 The person on leave is compensated with 85 percent of the person’s unemployment insurance 
(UI) benefits which in turn are 80 percent of his or her wage, with a cap of 80 percent of SEK 
20,075 per month (≈ € 2,150 in August, 2003). Similar programmes are, or have been, in place 
also in Finland, Denmark and Belgium. 
5 The data base is administrated by the National Labour Market Board (Ams). IFAU – Early indication of program performance  9 
individual’s labour market history the data set includes information on basic 
individual background characteristics (see Table 1).  
The stock of substitutes consists of 2,131 individuals that started their 
participation during the first eight months of the piloting scheme, i.e. between 
February and September 2002. The substitutes must be registered at an 
unemployment office in order to be eligible for the program. After removal of 
individuals with unknown starting dates and inconsistencies in their registered 
unemployment histories 1,847 substitutes remain in the sample.
6 
Ideally, we would match the substitutes to other unemployed workers at the 
time the program started, but then we would have to wait until data on the first 
cohorts who have completed the program is available. Instead, we match the 
participants to a comparison group from the previous year. The main advantage 
is that this facilitates estimation of the treatment intensity for all participants 
who have entered the program. In theory, the net intensity can be estimated as 
soon as the first participants have entered the program, thus making it possible 
to answer one of the policy makers’ key questions much faster than 
conventionally.  
The use of a comparison group from the previous year can be justified in 
two ways. First, in this particular case it appears that the economic conditions 
were very similar in 2001 and 2002.
7 Second (and more generally), the results 
can be interpreted as estimates of what the treatment intensity would have 
been, if the program had existed in 2001 and the selection process would have 
been the same as it was in 2002. 
The comparison group is chosen from all unemployed individuals registered 
at any of the unemployment offices in the 12 participating municipalities 
between February and September 2001. In total 133,279 individuals were 
registered in one of the participating municipalities during 2001. 
 
3.3 Matching 
To avoid problems with seasonality we match each substitute to a worker who 
was unemployed during the month that the substitute started to participate (but 
                                                      
6 3 % of the individuals where dropped from the sample since their recorded unemployment 
histories contained fundamental contradictions (see Bennmarker et al, 2000). 8 % where 
excluded due to unknown starting dates for their program participation.  
7 The monthly unemployment numbers as measured by the Labour Force Surveys are extremely 
similar in 2001 and 2002; see e.g. SCB (2003). IFAU – Early indication of program performance  10
in 2001). Thus, a substitute starting the program in a given month in 2002 is 
matched to an unemployed worker registered in the15th of the same month in 
2001.
8  
The propensity scores are estimated by probit. Table 1 shows descriptive 
statistics on the variables included in the probit estimations in the May-
sample.
9 All time-varying variables (such as the length of the unemployment 
spell prior to participation) are measured at the start of the program for the 
substitute. For the comparison persons, they are measured at the 15
th during the 
relevant month.   
Besides the propensity, we match on unemployment prior to participation as 
it is considered as a crucial variable explaining both participation and the 
probability of employment, i.e. the treatment. The distance between the 
estimated propensity and the length of the unemployment spell is measured by 
a Mahalanobis distance metric.
10 Nearest neighbour matching is applied with 
replacement.
11 Columns (1) and (3) in Table 1 illustrate the matching quality in 
the May-sample.
12 
                                                      
8 15
th each month is chosen simply to pick a random date. 
9 It may be interesting to note that we tested matching on the entire vector of X instead of the 
propensity, but in spite of the high number of potential comparisons it was impossible to find 
exact matches to all substitutes. 
10 The Mahalanobis distance metric is frequently used in the matching literature, see e.g. Lechner 
(2001) and Larsson (2003). 
11 However, due to the large size of the stock of unemployed in 2001 only very few persons are 
matched more than once. Thus, the standard errors are not adjusted for matching with 
replacement. 
12 A more detailed description and results of the matching procedure can be obtained from the 
authors by request. A description in Swedish is found in Fröberg et al (2003). IFAU – Early indication of program performance  11 
 
Table 1 Results of the matching procedure (May) 
 
 
May 
substitutes 
Entire 
stock 
Matched 
comparisons 
N 224  72  893  224 
      
Length of current registration spell at 
start of participation or May 15   393  947  391 
Days of registration the last 2 years   369  512  359 
Days of registration in total until start of 
participation or May 15   1456  1 740  1467 
Status as registered at start of 
participation or May 15 (%) 
    
Open unemployment   25,0  29,0  28,6 
Part time unemployed   17,0  13,0  19,6 
Employed on hourly basis  23,2  10,1  19,2 
Temporary employment  8,9  2,9  8,9 
On-the-job search  7,1  5,5  5,8 
Miscellaneous 18,8  39,5  17,9 
Number of spells of registration until 
start of participation or May 15 
 
3,6 
 
3,0 
 
3,8 
Fraction females (%)  62,9  50,4  62,9 
Age 34,9  39,4  34,1 
Citizenship (%)       
Swedish 94,2  83,9  95,6 
Nordic 0,9  2,3  1,3 
Non-Nordic 4,9  13,8  3,1 
Education (%)       
Compulsory schooling only  20,1  29,6  14,3 
High school  58,0  48,6  62,9 
Tertiary education  21,9  21,8  22,8 
Disability (%)  3,6  19,5  3,6 
Searching outside local area (%)  11,2  13,1  13,8 
Desired working time (%)       
Full time (%)  57,2  44,9  57,6 
Part time (%)  2,2  5,6  3,1 
Both 40,6  49,5  39,3 
Benefits (%)       
UI 77,2  71,6  77,7 
Cash allowance  6,3  6,9  8,5 
No benefits  16,5  21,5  13,8 
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3.4 Results 
Treatment is measured by the number of employment days during the average 
program period of 10 months, or 304 days.
 13  For the substitutes, it is by 
definition equal to unity. The measure we actually use is the number of days 
that the matched comparison group spent away from unemployment.
14 Thus, in 
interpreting the results we equalize non-registration with employment and 
disregard possible transitions out of the labour force.   
Table 2 shows the amount of treatment (in days) for the matched 
comparison group and the entire stock of unemployed during the average 
program length (Columns 1 and 2). The results clearly show that persons with 
good expected labour market outcomes are selected into the program. For 
example, substitutes starting in the program in June would have been employed 
approximately 150 of the subsequent 304 days without the program. 
Since the matched comparison groups receive much treatment, it is obvious 
that the net treatment intensity of the program is far from unity. Column (3) 
shows that without the program, the typical substitute is expected to receive 
treatment during about half of the average program duration. Thus, strong 
treatment effects are required from each unit of (net) treatment for the program 
to pass a cost benefit analysis.
15 
 
                                                      
13 Ten months is the average program length for substitutes in the first cohort, i.e. those who 
already had completed their participation by the time of the data collection.  If the net treatment 
intensity is to be estimated directly after the introduction of a new program, this information is 
not available and some estimated average program length must be used.  
14 Unemployment is defined as being registered as a job-seeker in a category that warrants 
compensation from unemployment insurance or other comparable sources (such as compensation 
for participating in labour market programmes).Thus, only the registration categories on the job 
search and in temporary employment are considered as employment. Using a more generous def-
inition of employment that would include even some of the labour market programmes would 
imply that our estimate of the net treatment intensity would be even lower. 
15 As a reference point it can be noted that the budget calculation assumed a net treatment of 
between 65 and 95 percent (Statskontoret, 2001). IFAU – Early indication of program performance  13 
 
Table 2 Counterfactual unemployment during participation 
  Counterfactual 
treatment in days (t
0) 
Net treatment 
intensity in % of 
304 Days (Λ) 
Number of 
comparisons 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Starting 
month 
Matched 
sample 
Entire 
stock  Λ = 1-t
0/304 
Match Stock 
February 134.7  91.8  0.557  62  75  433 
March 137.0  89.3  0.549  111  74  433 
April 110.8  90.9  0.636  226  74  148 
May 132.5  92.1  0.564  224  72  893 
June 149.9  100.4  0.507  228  79  090 
July 152.1  105.5 0.500  144  80  999 
August 165.6  112.3  0.455  438  82  084 
September 141.4  95.4  0.535  414  73  416 
Average
1 
(St.error) 
143.7 
(2.67) 
97.5 0.527 
(0.009) 
  
Note: Counterfactual treatment in days is calculated as the average program length (304 days) 
minus days of unemployment during this period. Counterfactual treatment is defined the number 
of days not registered in Händel (Händel registrations in the categories “in temporary 
employment“ and “on-the-job search” are counted as employment) from the 15th each month 
during the following 304 days. “Net Treatment” is calculated as the increase (in percent) in time 
spent as non-registered due to the program during the (average) program length. 
  
1The averages are weighted by the number of observations each month. 
 
One aspect that has been discussed in relation to the career-break substitutes 
is whether there should be a minimum requirement for the number of days of 
registration prior to the start of the program. Since we match not only on pro-
pensity score but also on the length of the unemployment spell prior to parti-
cipation, it is possible to study how the net treatment effect varies with the spell 
length. This is done in Figure 1. It shows clearly that the net intensity of treat-
ment is increasing with prior unemployment, suggesting that the net treatment 
could be increased by restricting eligibility to workers with a reasonably long 
unemployment history.  
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Figure 1 Net treatment intensity and prior unemployment 
 
Finally, there may still be an upward bias in the results. Many of the 
participants were unemployed for only a short spell before starting the pro-
gram. The unemployment spell was shorter than a week for approximately 17 
% of the sample. It is possible that at least some of the substitutes register as 
unemployed only in order to become eligible for the programme. In that case, 
their employment without the program would probably have been higher (and 
the true net treatment intensity lower) than estimated. 
 
 
4 Summary 
This paper proposes an application of standard evaluation techniques that 
provides useful information about a program as soon as the first participants 
have entered the program. The specific application estimates the net treatment 
intensity on the substitutes in the Swedish career-break program. Three main 
results emerge: First, the selection of participating substitutes favours those that 
would have received a large amount of treatment even without the program. IFAU – Early indication of program performance  15 
Second, the net treatment intensity is far from 1; the net treatment provided by 
the program was only in the order of half the length of the program. Third, the 
net treatment was larger for participants with a longer preceding spell of 
unemployment, suggesting that a change in the eligibility criteria could 
increase the efficiency of the program.  IFAU – Early indication of program performance  16
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